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I am very happy to be here this afternoon if for no other rea-
son than to lend to the proceedings the tripartite character that the
previous speakers have emphasized is so necessary to any fair
consideration of the problems that we are discussing.
In passing I might say that I was very much interested in Mr.
Gill's hope that some way might be found to get around the disputes
provisions of the Taft-Hartley Law which he thinks are or may be
an obstacle to the proper administration of any disputes procedure
under Wage Stabilization. The labor movement has been suggesting
ways of getting around that problem for the past three years. There
are bills in the Congressional hopper now calling for the repeal of
the Taft-Hartley Law. And as a matter of fact the C.I.O. has very
seriously urged the repeal of this law as an aid to promoting the
kind of unity and stability that we require during these critical
times.
The manner in which the newspapers have handled the depar-
ture of the labor members from the Wage Stabilization Board would
lead one to believe that the question of a percentage point or two
of wage increase was crucial and that if the Board had come out
with a 12 per cent formula instead of a 10 per cent formula labor
would have been satisfied. It is also suggested that the walk-out of
the labor members was prompted not so much by their dissatis-
faction at the proposed wage formula as by their dissatisfaction
over the failure of the administration to give labor a proper voice
in policy making.
Although these were certainly important considerations, I be-
lieve that the action of the labor members of the Wage Stabilization
Board would have been exactly the same if labor had been given a
proper voice in policy formulation (although perhaps in that case
the formula never would have been recommended) because I be-
lieve that the unions in this country and their leaders are convinced
that this formula is unfair, that it is unacceptable to the American
worker and that therefore it is unworkable.
It has been pointed out by several of the speakers, that the
question of wage stabilization cannot be considered solely from the
standpoint of economic principle. It is a political problem, one
which involves the daily bread and butter of the working people of
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the United States. No matter how good a formula may appear on
its face, no matter how sound it may be when tested by so-called
economic principles for controlling inflation it will not work if it is
regarded as unfair or discriminatory by the working people of this
country.
Several of the speakers at both sessions today have suggested
that the problem of wage stabilization is only one part of our gen-
eral problem of controlling inflation. But curiously enough, that is
the only part of the problem which has been vigorously dealt with.
Food prices continue to rise at a scandalous rate and Congress
dawdles and temporizes in considering even an unfair and inade-
quate tax program. There are important sections of the country
without rent control and the Federal Rent Control Act is due to
expire at the end of March. Speculation rages on the commodity
markets and it cannot be controlled under the explicit terms of the
Defense Production Act. The wholesale price index is skyrocketing,
but wages have been effectively frozen for the past month and now
it is proposed to stabilize them under a very rigid control formula.
When I say wages have been effectively frozen for the past month
I mean exactly that. It seems that a wage freeze is infinitely more
easy to administer than a price freeze. An employer tells the union
that he just cannot grant a wage increase without approval by the
Wage Stabilization Board, because if he does he will be subject to
a fine of $10,000 and maybe a jail sentence. So wages are frozen.
The impression created by the current national policy is that some-
one has decided to "get tough with labor". This stems from the
fact that the resolution, indeed, the ruthlessness with which the
wage problem has been handled seems to be in striking contrast
with the temporizing, ineffectual approach to the related questions
of taxation, price and rent control. In this connection the matter
of dispute handling which Mr. Gill touched upon is relevant. There
has been a violent dispute within the Wage Stabilization Board
between the labor members and industry members with respect
to the establishment of a disputes machinery within the Board.
The industry members are vigorously resisting it. It has been sug-
gested that one of the reasons for this attitude on the part of the
industry members is that they feel that labor had all the better
of it in the matter of dispute handling under the War Labor Board
and that they do not want a repetition of that now. There may be
good reasons for opposing the establishment of a disputes machin-
ery within the Wage Stabilization Board, but this is not one of
them. Rather it would seem to be another aspect of this "get tough
with labor" attitude.
A/fr. DiSalle himself, as we all know, has forecast a substantial
rise in the cost of living at least until next summer. The Dun &
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Bradstreet index of wholesale food prices has been rising sharply
for the past ten weeks and now stands at 22 7/10% above the pre-
Korean level and 25 4/10% above the level of a year ago. Anyone
who has been buying groceries knows what has been happening to
retail prices, and these wholesale prices are going to be reflected
in the near future in the prices that we pay for food. Food is the
largest item in the worker's budget. Now it would seem to be only
common sense that this kind of a situation does not provide a
proper basis for any rigid wage control formula. To firmly hold
the line on wages while everything which wages must buy is rising
is neither fair nor reasonable nor is it workable. The C.I.O. has
charged recently that the entire price control program is a "cynical
hoax". One does not have to go that far to agree that it has been
completely ineffectual in controlling the cost of living.
It is revelant to consider the status of American corporations
as bearing on the question of equality of sacrifice. According to
the February report of the Council of Economic Advisors, corp-
orate profits for the fourth quarter of 1950 were estimated as being
the greatest in our history, at the rate of 48 billion dollars per
year before taxes and 26 7/10 billion after taxes. Dividend pay-
ments were also at an all time high. There was no mere 10% rise
over the preceding year in these figures.
As has been pointed out, and it is worth emphasizing, our
country is very far from being on a war basis. We are still making
a lot more butter than we are guns and civilian production goes
on alongside a gradually developing armament program. The 50,000
casualties in distant Korea have done very little to dispel the
business-as-usual atmosphere in this country. Congress itself seems
much more concerned with some of the less important, but better
headline-making aspects of its work, than in working out an equit-
able tax program which would put the main burden where it be-
longs, in conferring adequate power on the President and the
Price Administrator to control prices and speculation and to pro-
tect people against rent gouging.
Against this background it simply does not make sense to
impose a rigid wage formula. Even if the proposed formula were
otherwise a good one, it would meet with resistance and resent-
ment because the worker would feel, and rightfully so, that of
all the elements in our economy he was being singled out for special
treatment and that his wages were the one portion of the inflation-
ary forces which was being controlled. The current situation cries
out for a formula which is highly flexible and which can be molded
to fit our developing needs as the defense program moves ahead.
As Mr. Daugherty pointed out, it was not until October 1942
that the War Labor Board obtained control over wages. Until that
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time voluntary wage increases had been outside the jurisdiction
of the Board. That was almost a year after Pearl Harbor. The
country was at war. We are not in that kind of a situation now
and perhaps we will never be. General Marshall and others have
emphasized that what we have to look forward to is a long period
of tension -a difficult period, because we will be neither at war
nor at peace. We will be preparing for war while carrying on our
civilian activities and this may continue for years. This again em-
phasizes the need for the greatest kind of flexibility in any approach
to the wage problem.
It is stated in the Defense Production Act that any wage sta-
bilization program should promote not only the stability of wages
but also the stability of labor-management relations. It seems to
follow that existing collective bargaining agreements should not
be interfered with at this time by any stabilization formula which
may be applied. There are at least two million workers who are
under long term contract for terms ranging from two to five years,
contracts which were signed in 1950 or before. Some of these con-
tracts, like those in the auto industry, call for periodic wage ad-
justments based on the rise or fall of the cost of living and so-called
annual improvement factor increases. Others provide for auto-
matic wage increases in succeeding years. Some of them call for
additional fringe benefits such as holidays or additional shift pre-
miums or vacations in the later years of the contract. These con-
tracts reflect the considered judgment of the parties as reflected
in collective bargaining and their terms are the end result of the
give and take at the bargaining table. Anybody who has had any
experience in this field knows, for example, that the terms of a
one year contract would not be the same as the terms of the first
year of a two year contract or the first year of a three or five year
contract. To declare these contracts inoperative would do violence
to the intent of the parties and would have a serious unstabilizing
effect. I do not believe, and I have seen no convincing evidence
to the effect, that these contracts would have any substantial in-
flationary effect if permitted to run their course even if they yield-
ed a little more than whatever percentage of increase was consid-
ered to be allowable under a stabilization formula. On the other
hand the unsettling effects upon our economy of disturbing these
contracts seem to me to be a danger to be avoided by a stabilization
agency. Perhaps a year from now the view point that I have ex-
pressed may be subject to change. However, on the basis of the
facts that are before us now, including the entire economic and
political picture, it would seem to be most unwise to interfere with
the operation of these contracts.
In addition, there seems to be a complete lack of consistency
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between the position that these contracts may not be permitted
to yield a higher percentage of wage increase than the formula
may allow and the view which is taken of contracts for less than
one year that were negotiated and went into effect before January
25. There are many unions which, like the coal miners, were able
to obtain wage increases of 20% or more between the first part
of 1950 and January 25 of this year. Incidentally I believe it is
estimated that the value of the increases which Mr. Lewis obtained
in the early part of 1950 and in January of this year, including not
only the wage increases but the additional royalty payments to
the pension fund which they obtained last year, total a little better
than 20%. In most instances, as in the case of the miners, these
increases were accomplished in two steps: a regular negotiation
in the first part of 1950 and then a voluntary or premature reopen-
ing of the contract in the latter part of the year or in January of
1951. All of these contracts will be permitted to run their course
and will not be disturbed under the proposed formula no matter
how great the excess in wage increase may be over that contem-
plated by the wage formula. Yet, other unions which early in
1950 entered into two year contracts yielding more than the per-
mitted percentage of increase by virtue of an automatic or cost
of living increase in the second year will find their contracts in
jeopardy. Why the latter situation is more inflationary than the
former I cannot understand. Why it would have a more stimulating
effect upon the inflationary spiral if Mr. Lewis had obtained 10%
in 1950 and an additional 10% in May 1951 than it would have
if he obtained 10% in the Spring of 1950 and 10% in January of
1951, I do not understand.
I believe that for the purpose of promoting stability and for
the sake of consistency, and in this kind of a situation consistency
is a good course to follow because it is very difficult for workers
to understand why distinctions of this kind should be made, these
long term contracts should not be disturbed.
This leads us to the question of escalator clauses, which have
been touched on and which I was happy to hear Mr. Daugherty
say should not be disturbed. I would like to talk about them at
greater length. As I have said, I am not an economist. I have heard
it said time and again that to permit these cost of living increases
is inflationary and I have heard as many and as convincing argu-
ments on the other side. It seems to me that they are inflationary
only in the same manner as any accretion to the purchasing power
of workers is inflationary. However, it is important to note that
under these escalator clauses the rise in wages comes after the
rise in the cost of living has taken place and not before. So it is
at least clear that the wage increase is brought about by the rise
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in living costs and not vice-versa. It is also clear that if such wage
increases are not permitted, the real value of worker's earnings
is reduced. It is also clear that if the line is held on prices and
rents, as Mr. Daugherty has so well pointed out, the cost of living
will be stabilized and the escalator clauses will yield no increases.
The conclusion would seem to follow that the danger, if any, in
escalator clauses, can arise only from the failure of the government
to hold living costs down. And if the line cannot be held on prices,
rents and other living costs, why should it be held rigidly on wages?
It would be very hard to explain to American workers why cost
of living increases in existing contracts should not be honored. In
this connection Dr. George W. Taylor, who has also been advising
the Wage Stabilization Board, in a very down-to-earth approach
to this problem in a recent speech in Detroit, suggested that in
view of the obvious inability of the government to cope with the
problem of inflation on other fronts it might be appropriate,
a ... now to approve the operation of the wage escalator clauses
of long-term agreements until some future specified date, say as
far ahead as September or December 1951, for example, when
the wage escalator matter would be again re-examined on its
merits. By that time we may have developed a stronger inflation
control progran. Can we hope that by then the wage escalator
clauses will be of academic interest because of the stabilization of
the cost of living?". Here we have an example of the type of prac-
tical, flexible thinking which our present situation requires. It
seems such obviously good sense not to disturb escalator clauses at
a time when we have hardly come to grips with the problem of
controlling inflation, that it is difficult to understand why those
who are charged with the duty of formulating the wage policy
have chosen even to raise such an issue now.
I would like to talk briefly about the base period for stabilizing
wages. It has not been touched upon by any of our speakers and
is important. What should be the standard here? It seems to me
that the answer to this question is quite clear in the light of the
language of the Defense Production Act itself, which states, and
I quote it, "So far as practicable in exercising the authority con-
ferred in this section," and this is the section dealing with wage
and price control, "the president shall ascertain and give due con-
sideration to comparable salaries, wages or other compensation
which he finds to be representative of those prevailing during the
period from May 24, 1950 to June 24, 1950 inclusive" which is
the month just before Korea. The same period was to be consid-
ered for price control purposes. Yet when prices were frozen they
were frozen at their peak in January 1951 while the proposed
wage formula which has been recommended by the Wage Stabili-
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zation Board would allow workers not more than 10% over Jan-
uary 15, 1950. Now, why that date? There has been no explana-
tion as to why that date was used and I can't think of any good
reason for taking the date except that it is just about at the be-
ginning of 1950 and that it has the effect of catching all of the
wage increases which were negotiated during the entire year of
1950. This, raises a very serious problem with respect to the entire
question of stabilization. If you examine the statistics with refer-
ence to wage settlements during 1950 you will observe that those
which were negotiated during the first part of the year before the
Korean situation developed, were comparatively small, ranging
around 5 or 6 cents an hour for the most part. After the start of
the Korean War and up to the end of the year, there was a sharp
rise in the size of wage settlements and they ranged commonly
from 15 to 22 cents an hour or higher. The difference between
these later increases and the earlier ones was not attributable
merely to the rise in the cost of living but also to the increased
activity and prosperity of industry and perhaps even more to the
prospect of a further inflationary rise. The selection of the Jan-
uary 15, 1950 base date will effectively prevent those workers
whose contracts were negotiated during the first half of the year
from overtaking those whose contracts were opened after the
Korean crisis. As Mr. Daugherty has pointed out, the purpose
of the Little Steel Formula was to bring the laggards up to the
level which had been attained by those unions which were able
to obtain substantial wage increases during the pre-Little Steel
Formula period, which was about 15 months. But this new formula
which has been recommended by the Wage Stabilization Board,
does not have that effect of permitting the laggards to catch up.
There was a very interesting discussion of this question recently
by Dr. Taylor in which he suggested that although the fifth round
of wage increases was the round which was to take place in 1950,
it appeared from the size and nature of the increases during the
latter part of the year that there was an overlapping of the fifth
and sixth rounds and that, therefore, it might very well be neces-
sary to make some extra allowance to those employees whose
contracts had been negotiated during the early part of the year
in order to enable them to catch up. It would have been far wiser
and more in keeping with the intent of Congress as expressed by
the Defense Production Act if the base period of May to June of
1950 had been chosen instead of the base period of January 15, 1950.
The question of fringe benefits is of very great importance.
These include holidays, vacations, premium pay days, rest periods,
insurance, pensions and other benefits which are separate and
apart from the actual wage scale. The question is, should the
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value of these be included as part of the allowable percentage of
increase permitted under the stabilization formula? The recom-
mended formula which is in dispute at the present time takes a
peculiar view of the problem. In respect to those fringe benefits
which were negotiated before the date of the stabilization order,
these would not be offset against the 10% which is allowed; but
with respect to any contract negotiated after the date of the order,
they would be offset against the 10% allowed. If only for reasons
of administrative expediency, it would appear that fringe benefits
should not be included as part of the allowable percentage of
wage increase. While the cost of pensions and insurance plans
may be readily ascertainable in many cases, how can one figure
the cost to the employer of some of these other benefits? For
example, I have heard employers complain bitterly during contract
negotiations about the tremendous amount of premium pay which
would result from making Saturday a time-and-a-half day, who
virtually emiminated Saturday work completely once the contract
had been signed. The same thing might be said of other types of
fringe benefits. The dissenting opinion of the labor members who
quit the Wage Stabilization Board points out, "The public mem-
bers of the Board are in possession of a memorandum from the
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, which concludes that it
is impossible to provide a quantitative measurement of many if not
most of these forms of fringe compensation." From an adminis-
trative standpoint, the Board would do well to avoid the problem of
trying to figure out the prospective cost to the employer of fringe
benefits which may be in dispute.
The two fringe benefits which are of the greatest importance
currently are insurance and pension plans, and you all know that
unions have been laying great stress on these benefits in recent
years. Payments of this kind by the employer do not place addi-
tional purchasing power into the hands of workers and they are
not inflationary in any sense. It is true that they add to the cost
of the product but considering the unparalleled prosperity of
American industry it seems to me that this is a cost which could
easily be absorbed without any inflationary effect if American
industry were required to absorb it.
I have referred to the peculiar treatment of the fringe benefit
problem in the proposed wage stabilization formula. If this treat-
ment follows any logical rationale, I have not heard it. It is pro-
vided in effect that if a pension or an insurance plan was nego-
tiated between January 15, 1950 and the date of the stabilization
regulation, it shall not be included as part of the allowable 10%
wage increase but that if a pension or insurance plan or any
other fringe benefit is negotiated after the effective date of the
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stabilization regulation, it is to be offset against the allowable
wage increase. This schizophrenic treatment of fringe benefits is
probably the result of a compromise within the Wage Stabilization
Board but the net result is such a transparent inequity that the
whole arrangement become indefensible. Why should a union
which negotiated pensions and insurance worth 10% in December
of 1950 be permitted to obtain another 10% increase in wages now,
while another union which negotiated a 10% increase in wages
in December 1950 is barred from negotiating either a further
wage increase or any pension or insurance plan now. I have dis-
cussed this with workers and with union officials to get their re-
action and I have obtained a very uniform reaction. They all tell
me it's impossible. They say "There is no such animal." Serious-
ly, this sort of unequal and illogical treatment of a very vital prob-
lem does not augur well for the future.
While it is true that the Defense Production Act requires the
stabilization of so-called fringe benefits as "other compensation"
this does not mean that they must be treated in the same manner
as wages. It would be equitable, for example, and I think permis-
sible under the law, to stabilize pension and insurance plans and
other fringe benefits within the limits of commonly established
programs in the industry or the area in order to prevent abuses.
Any equitable wage formula should provide for the correction
of sub-standard wages. By sub-standard I mean wages which are
below the level required for subsistence. Unions have not yet
succeeded in correcting this situation completely and there are
still very substantial segments of our population, particularly in
unorganized areas, whose wages are below subsistence level. Such
wages should not be frozen below the subsistence level by a sta-
bilization formula. The commended formula makes no allowance
for relief in such cases.
I would like to sum up very briefly. Any sound wage sta-
bilization formula must be geared to the entire program of control-
ling inflation. That has been said so many times today that it
sounds like a cliche but it is so important that it cannot be over
emphasized. No wage stabilization program can succeed, nor does
it deserve to succeed, if it means that workers will suffer reduction
of their living standards while industry makes greater profits
than ever and profiteering, rent gouging and speculation are per-
mitted to continue unabated. The wage stabilization program can
be effective only if it is accepted by American workers as embody-
ing their equal share of the sacrifice to be made by all segments
of our economy. They will not and should not accept a formula
which amounts to a wage freeze for millions of workers- and
this is true to a large extent of this recommended formula - while
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the cost of living continues to mount and while our government
makes no move to control food prices, or commdity speculation, or
to siphon off the excessive income of corporations and individuals
by an equitable tax program. If an attempt were made to impose
such a formula on American workers it would result in such un-
rest and loss of morale as to threaten the national unity which
our situation requires. It would unstabilize rather than stabilize
our economy. It is to be hoped that the proposed formula will be
scrapped in favor of a new and statesmanlike approach to the
problem.
